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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT OF UNREGISTERED WORKS:
A BITE AT AN UNRIPE APPLE?
Aaron B. Rabinowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
By one estimate, copyright infringement costs American
businesses each year $58 billion in output, 373,375 lost jobs,
and $16 billion in lost employee earnings, and costs the
United States government each year more than $2.6 billion in
lost taxes.1  The severe penalties for criminal copyright
infringement amply demonstrate that Congress has
recognized the harm posed by such activity.2
The proliferation of interconnected computer networks3
has enabled infringers to copy and distribute authors' works
more quickly than ever before. In some cases, infringers
distribute copies of works before those works are even
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1. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POL'Y INNOVATION, POLICY REPORT 189:
THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 14
(2007), available at http://www.ipi.org/ipi%5CIPIPublications.nsf/Publication
LookupFullTextPDF/02DAOB4B44F2AE9286257369005ACB57/$File/Copyright
Piracy.pdf?OpenElement.
2. First-time criminal copyright offenders face up to a five-year felony
conviction, with successive offenses resulting in incarceration of up to ten years.
18 U.S.C § 2319(b) (2006).
3. One source estimates that 1.1 billion of the world's 6.6 billion people
have internet access. Richard Wray, China Overtaking US for Fast Internet
Access as Africa Gets Left Behind, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 14, 2007, at
29, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/un/14
internetphonesbroadband.digitalmedia
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publicly released-in one 2003 case, an incomplete version of
the motion picture "The Hulk" was illegally uploaded to the
Internet before the final version of the film was released in
theatres.4
In response to the increase in pre-release infringement,
Congress modified the copyright laws to provide greater
protections for authors and greater deterrents for would-be
infringers.5 In particular, because the existing laws did not
permit civil actions for infringement of works that had not
been formally registered with the Copyright Office,6 Congress
created a preregistration scheme under which authors may
submit an application and fee to the Copyright Office in
return for a grant of "preregistered" status to the work.7
While a preregistered work does not enjoy all of the same
legal protections as a registered work,8 a preregistered work
may still serve as the basis for a civil infringement action.9
Broadening the availability of civil infringement actions
expands the remedies available to authors who have not
formally registered their works and helps address
infringement as early and as aggressively as possible.
Whether criminal proceedings are similarly available to
address infringement of works that are not formally
registered or are merely preregistered is another issue
entirely, and is an issue the courts have not addressed.lO
4. Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg.
42286, 42287 (July 22, 2005) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202). The defendant
ultimately pled guilty to criminal copyright infringement. Simon Byers et al.,
An Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie Production and Distribution
Process, 28 TELECOMM. POL'Y 619, 621 (2004).
5. Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119
Stat. 218; 70 Fed. Reg. at 42286.
6. Formerly, a civil infringement action could only be instituted if the work
in question were registered.
7. "Preregistration is a service intended for works that have had a history
of prerelease infringement. It focuses on the infringement of movies, recorded
music, and other copyrighted materials before copyright owners have had the
opportunity to market fully their products." See Preregister Your Work,
http://www.copyright.gov/prereg/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2009); see also 37 C.F.R. §
202.16 (2008) (Copyright Office rules for preregistration).
8. For example, while registration of a work serves as prima facie evidence
of copyright ownership, preregistration does not. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(c)(13).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (preregistration provides proper basis for civil
infringement action).
10. As of the date of this writing, no court case has squarely addressed the
question whether registration is a prerequisite to bringing a criminal
infringement action. See infra Part III.A.
794 [Vo1:49
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Nevertheless, the United States Department of Justice and
several leading commentators 1 suggested, based on the then-
existing statute,12 that-unlike a civil infringement action13 -
a criminal infringement proceeding does not require that the
work at issue be formally registered with the Copyright
Office.4
This suggestion, however, was misplaced. While such
prosecutions would provide an additional deterrent to would-
be infringers, criminal prosecutions for infringement of
unregistered or preregistered works are in fact legally
improper. Through a review of relevant statutes-including
the recent amendments to the Copyright Act-and past and
11. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CRIMES 22-24 (3d ed. 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanual/ipma2006.pdf; Michael M.
DuBose, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-First
Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 488-89 (2006); see also 2 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 11.4.1 n.15 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
12. An amended version of § 411(a) was signed into law on October 13,
2008-several months after this article was accepted for publication-to make
clear that registration is a prerequisite for civil actions. See Prioritizing
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act, Pub. L. No. 110-403,
122 Stat. 4256, 4257-58 (2008). While the amended
§ 411(a) arguably supports the position that registration is not a prerequisite for
criminal prosecutions, the amendments also raise a statutory ambiguity that
arguably supports the position that registration is a prerequisite for a criminal
infringement prosecution. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (barring civil infringement action unless
work at issue is registered or preregistered).
14. Perhaps recognizing this shortcoming, the Department of Justice
proposed the "Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2007," which proposal
would, inter alia, amend 17 U.S.C. § 411 to make clear that registration of a
work is not a prerequisite for criminal infringement proceedings. Letter from
Richard A. Hertling, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department
of Justice to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (May
14, 2007), available at http://politechbot.com/docs/doj.intellectual.property.
protection.act.2007.051407.pdf (enclosing a copy of Intellectual Property
Protection Act of 2007). A modified version of this proposal was, however,
signed into law on October 13, 2008. See § 411(a), 122 Stat. at 4257-58 (2008).
The legislative history regarding whether registration is a precondition
to a criminal copyright prosecution is inconclusive. Compare 133 CONG. REC.
14,149 (1987) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (proposing "additional incentives for
timely registration by all copyright claimants [including] imposition of a
registration requirement for criminal enforcement of a copyright") with S. REP.
NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3743 ("[Rlegistration
is not a statutory precondition for criminal enforcement of copyright . . ."). In
2007, the Department of Justice proposed an amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a),
which amendment was at least partially incorporated into the statute signed
into law on October 13, 2008. See Letter from Richard A. Hertling to Nancy
Pelosi, supra.
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present case law, this article argues that allowing such
prosecutions (1) fails to consider past and present statutory
ambiguity that must be construed in defendants' favor under
the rule of lenity, (2) ignores the established linkage between
civil copyright law and criminal law, and (3) fails to accord
proper deference to the administrative role of the Copyright
Office. This article also proposes several solutions to the
problem of infringement of unregistered works, which
solutions account for the basic administrative principles
underlying copyright law while also providing clear guidance
for authors and prosecutors alike concerning the reach of
criminal infringement actions.15
II. BACKGROUND
To properly address whether there is a proper legal basis
for criminal prosecutions of unregistered or preregistered
works, a general overview of copyright infringement,
copyright registration, and copyright preregistration is
helpful.
A. Copyright Infringement
1. Civil Copyright Infringement
Copyright attaches to any original creative work once
that work is fixed in a "tangible medium of expression." 6
While not all works are sufficiently original to qualify for
copyright protection, the originality bar is nevertheless a low
one. 17
Civil copyright infringement has only two elements: "(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original."'" Civil copyright
infringement considers only whether unauthorized copying
took place and does not account for the infringer's intent. 9
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
17. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
18. Id. at 361 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
19. E.g., Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (describing copyright infringement as a "strict liability tort").
796 [Vo1:49
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2. Criminal Copyright Infringement
Criminal copyright infringement has the same basic
elements as civil copyright infringement, but with some
additional requirements. In addition to proving ownership
and copying of original constituent elements, the prosecution
must also prove that the infringement was willful, and either
(1) the defendant acted for commercial advantage or private
financial gain; (2) the defendant reproduced or distributed,
including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, one
or more copies or phonorecords of one or more copyrighted
works,2° which have a total retail value of more than $1000;
or (3) the defendant distributed a work being prepared for
commercial distribution, by making it available on a
computer network accessible to members of the public, if the
defendant knew or should have known that the work was
intended for commercial distribution. 1
The penalties for criminal copyright infringement are
severe. A defendant convicted of for-profit infringement
under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A), of non-profit infringement
under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B), or of pre-release infringement
under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C) may face incarceration for up
to five years,22 depending on the number and value of the
works infringed.
20. Infringement may occur by violation of any of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights, which rights include the rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (defining infringement as
violation of any of the exclusive rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106).
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1)(A)-(C).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (2006).
2009] 797
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B. Registration
Copyright registration is a "ministerial" process 23 in
which an applicant supplies to the Copyright Office certain
information about his or her work, along with a fee. The
Copyright Office then reviews the work and the author's
supporting information.24  A granted registration is
presumptive evidence that the copyright is valid,25 and also
entitles the registrant to (1) institute a civil action for
infringement of the work 26 and (2) recover statutory damages
and attorneys' fees in such an action.27  Critically, the
copyright laws do not allow institution of an infringement suit
unless the owner of the work has preregistered or sought to
register the work with the Copyright Office.2"
C. Preregistration
As described supra, Congress created a preregistration
scheme under which authors can obtain "preregistered"
status for their works upon filing an application and a fee.29
A preregistered work can be a basis for a civil infringement
action.30 The Copyright Office does not, however, perform any
substantive review or evaluation of works submitted for
preregistration.31  Thus, in the broadest sense, the
23. Nadel & Sons Toy Corp. v. William Shaland Corp., 657 F. Supp. 133,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006)
(registration granted if Register of Copyrights determines that deposited work
'constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and formal
requirements of this title have been met").
25. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006); 17 U.S.C. §§ 505-506 (2006) (setting statutory
damages and attorney fees).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Denial of a registration application does not,
however, foreclose the owner from filing an infringement suit:
[W]here the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have
been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration
has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for
infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on
the Register of Copyrights.
Id.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2006).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
31. "[Tlhe online [preregistration] application form will not be examined
except to ascertain that all the necessary information has been provided by the
applicant." See U.S. Copyright Office, Preregistration Information,
http://www.copyright.gov/preregthelp.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (emphasis
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preregistration scheme allows authors to purchase
administrative agency recognition of their work, although the
depth of this recognition is limited because the recognition is
not based on an actual evaluation of the work's merits.
Preregistration is available only for those types of works
the Copyright Office considers vulnerable to being copied and
distributed before the work's planned release or publication.2
These types of works include movies, musical compositions,
sound recordings, computer software, video games, literary
works, and various kinds of photographs. These types of
works may be preregistered if they are unpublished but are
"being prepared for commercial distribution," which means
that the owner has a reasonable expectation that the work
will be commercially distributed to the public, and that the
work, if not finished, has at least been commenced. 4
After the author submits an application and fee, the
Copyright Office undertakes a clerical review of the
application. 5  If approved, the Copyright Office will
preregister the work and issue a certificate. A preregistered
work may serve as a basis for a civil infringement action,36
but preregistration-unlike registration-does not serve as
prima facie evidence of the validity or ownership of a
copyright.37
III. DISCUSSION
The copyright laws clearly require that a work be
registered or preregistered before the owner institutes a civil
infringement action,3" and before the most recent
amendments, the relevant laws were ambiguous regarding
whether a work must be registered or preregistered before a
criminal infringement action could be initiated. 9 While the
most recent amendments arguably resolve that ambiguity in
added).
32. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16 (2008).
33. Id.
34. See id. at § 202.16(b)(2).
35. See supra note 31.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
37. 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(c).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
39. As of the time of this writing, no recent case had squarely addressed this
issue.
2009] 799
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
some part,4 ° the amendments nevertheless fail to fully resolve
the ambiguity surrounding whether criminal infringement
prosecutions require that the underlying work be registered.
Further, in light of relevant case law, the amendments can be
read as confirming that registration is a prerequisite to a
criminal infringement prosecution.41 In any event, even
putting statutory language and controlling case law aside,
criminal prosecutions based on unregistered works are
additionally improper because such prosecutions fail to
recognize fully the role of the Copyright Office.
A. No Recent Case Has Addressed Whether Copyright
Registration Is a Precondition to a Criminal Infringement
Action42
Despite the increasing prevalence of prerelease
infringement, no recent court case had squarely addressed-
under the previous version of the statute-whether
registration was a prerequisite for instituting a criminal
prosecution. Because of this lack of recent case law guidance,
the leading case on the question whether registration of a
work with the Copyright Office is a prerequisite for a criminal
infringement action is the Second Circuit's 1943 decision in
United States v. Backer.43
In Backer, the defendant appealed his conviction for
willful infringement of copyright designs for various
figurines. 44 The defendant appealed his conviction on the
grounds that (1) the government failed to prove that his
infringement was "willful" and (2) that the registrations on
the copyrighted figurines were invalid.4 5 The Second Circuit,
however, rejected each of these arguments.
First, the Backer court concluded that because the
defendant had asked a third party to replicate the figurines
40. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4257-58 (2008); see also infra Part
III.B.2.
41. See infra Part III.C.2.
42. Because the amended version of § 411(a) took effect on October 13, 2008,
no case as of the time of this writing has applied the as-amended version of the
statute.
43. United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., on
panel).
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id. at 535.
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as closely as possible, the infringement had been willful.46
The court stated, however, that the defendant's argument
that the copyright registrations were invalid posed "a more
difficult issue" that was "of vital importance."47 Reviewing
the language of the then-existing Copyright Act, the court
concluded that the statute made registration "a condition
precedent to the maintenance of any action for
infringement."48 Because the author of the works at issue had
properly registered the works, the court upheld the
defendant's conviction.49
Although Backer was decided sixty-six years ago, no
other, more recent case has squarely addressed the
registration issue. In 2007, the First Circuit in United States
v. Beltran5" noted-but did not resolve-whether criminal
prosecution for infringement of unregistered works was
permissible under the then-existing version of 17 U.S.C. §
411(a).
In Beltran, the defendants appealed from their conviction
for criminal copyright infringement on the ground that the
government had failed to offer into evidence any certificates
of copyright registration.5' Acknowledging that it was
unclear whether or not registration was a condition precedent
to a criminal infringement prosecution, the First Circuit
nevertheless affirmed the defendants' conviction on the
ground that the defendants had stipulated to the certificates
of registration. 2  Thus, because the defendants had
stipulated to the registration, the Beltran court did not need
to address whether the government's failure to produce such




48. Id. The then-existing version of the Copyright Act made clear that the
term "action" included both civil infringement actions and criminal
infringement proceedings. Id.
49. United States v. Backer, 134 F.'.d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., on
panel).
50. United States v. Beltran, 503 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Another case that raised the question of whether registration of a work
is a prerequisite to a criminal infringement case is United States v. Stevens, 543
F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In that case, the defendants argued that their
indictment should be dismissed on the ground that the indictment erroneously
2009]
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Accordingly, there is no recent guidance from the courts
that precisely addresses whether registration is a
precondition to a criminal infringement action. Leading
commentators have identified the issue and note that while
Backer concluded that registration was not necessary at the
time of that decision,54 the registration question remains
open.55
B. The Copyright Laws-Past and Present-Are Ambiguous
Regarding Whether Registration Is a Prerequisite to Criminal
Infringement Prosecution
The copyright laws have been unclear regarding whether
registration was a prerequisite to criminal infringement
prosecutions, and this ambiguity required that the laws be
construed in favor of requiring registration before a criminal
prosecution. Although Congress recently amended the
copyright law to clarify that a civil infringement action
requires that the underlying work be registered or
preregistered with the Copyright Office, that amendment
failed to clarify whether criminal prosecutions do not require
registration, and the rule of lenity again arguably applies to
require registration before a criminal prosecution can be
initiated.
stated that a work had been registered with the Copyright Office as of the date
of the alleged infringement. Id. at 949. While the Stevens court denied the
defendants' motion, the court did so without acknowledging the Second Circuit's
conclusion in Backer that copyright registration was a prerequisite to a criminal
infringement proceeding, and without engaging in any statutory or case law
analysis of the issue.
54. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1 ("The requirement that the
copyright owner obtain a valid registration before an infringement action can be
instituted . . . may apply to criminal proceedings under the 1976 [Copyright]
Act.") (citing Backer, 134 F.2d at 535); 4 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 15.01[A] [2] (2005) ("The requirement of registration as a condition
to bringing an infringement action has been held applicable to criminal
actions.") (citing Backer, 134 F.2d 533).
55. For example, Goldstein notes that while 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) provides that
no "action" for infringement shall take place until a work is registered or
preregistered, other sections of the Copyright Act distinguished between "civil
actions" and "criminal proceedings." GOLDSTEIN supra note 11, § 11.4.1 n.15.
Goldstein thus suggests the reference to "action" in § 411(a) "would appear to
exempt criminal proceedings from the registration requirement." Id.; see
DuBose, supra note 11, at 488-89. As described later in Part III, this argument
is flawed for several reasons.
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1. Because Earlier Copyright Laws Were Ambiguous
Regarding Certain Distinctions Between Civil and
Criminal Matters, the Rule of Lenity Mandated That
the Ambiguity Be Construed in Defendants' Favor to
Require Registration Before a Criminal Proceeding
As discussed, certain leading commentators and the
Department of Justice have suggested that copyright
registration was not necessary-under the previous version of
§ 411(a)-to maintain a criminal infringement action.56
These suggestions were premised on the argument that the
copyright laws distinguished between civil and criminal
matters so as to imply that pre-action registration is only
necessary in the civil context.57  This argument was
misplaced, however, because the Copyright Act was
ambiguous regarding the distinction between civil and
criminal cases. Further, because the rule of lenity requires
that an ambiguity in a criminal statute be construed in favor
of defendant, this previous ambiguity in the Copyright Act
further supported the conclusion that registration was
necessary to the maintenance of a criminal infringement
prosecution.
Goldstein, among others,5" noted that while unamended §
411(a) of the Copyright Act provided that no "action" for
infringement shall take place until a work is registered or
preregistered, the Copyright Act's treatment of the statute of
limitations in 17 U.S.C. § 507 distinguished between "civil
actions" and "criminal proceedings."59 Because of this alleged
distinction between "civil actions" and "criminal proceedings,"
Goldstein suggested that the reference to "action" in § 411(a)
"would appear to exempt criminal proceedings from the
registration requirement."" This suggestion, however, was
flawed because it did not consider the title of § 507,61 and "the
56. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22-24; DuBose,
supra note 11, at 488-89; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1.
57. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22-24; DuBose,
supra note 11, at 488-89; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1.
58. See DuBose, supra note 11, at 488-89
59. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1.
60. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1; see also UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22-24.
61. In full, 17 U.S.C. § 507 reads:
§507. Limitations on actions
(a) Criminal proceedings. Except as expressly provided otherwise in
2009]
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title of a statute and the heading of a section" are "tools
available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a
statute. 62
The ambiguity in § 507 is shown through careful
examination of that section and its title.63 While § 507
specifies limitations periods for both "civil actions" and
"criminal proceedings,"64 § 507 is nevertheless itself titled
"Limitations on actions," not "Limitations on actions and
proceedings." Given that the title of § 507 refers only to
"actions" but that § 507 addresses both "civil actions" and
"criminal proceedings," the term "actions" may plausibly be
construed to encompass both "civil actions" and "criminal
proceedings" and thus does not necessarily refer exclusively to
civil actions.65 Thus, the Act itself is ambiguous regarding
whether civil actions and criminal prosecutions are distinct
from one another and always governed by different rules, or
whether civil and criminal matters are, at least in some
instances, grouped together as "actions" and are governed by
the same rules.
Under the rule of lenity, this ambiguity required that the
unamended statute be construed to require registration in
order to maintain a criminal prosecution; "[w]hen choice has
to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have
this title, no criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the
provisions of this title unless it is commenced within 5 years after the
cause of action arose.
(b) Civil actions. No civil action shall be maintained under the
provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after
the claim accrued.
17 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (emphasis added).
62. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998);
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, (1947); United
States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 170 (4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J., concurring).
This is a logical extension of the mandate that statutes "must, if possible, be
construed to give every word some operative effect." Cooper Indus. v. Aviall
Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 35-36 (1992)).
63. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234. The legislative history regarding
whether registration is a prerequisite to a criminal infringement action is
ambiguous at best. See supra note 14.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 507 (prescribing a three-year limitations period for civil
actions and a five-year limitations period for criminal proceedings).
65. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234 (reiterating that analysis of
statutory language must include review of section title).
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spoken in language that is clear and definite".66 Because
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity,"67 the fact that the resolution of
the ambiguity in this aspect of the copyright laws could be the
difference between a defendant facing a civil penalty or facing
incarceration required that the statute be construed in favor
of requiring registration before a criminal action can be
maintained-"without explicit congressional authorization,
courts will not impose criminal penalties for conduct within
the ban of the Copyright Act. '68 Thus, the ambiguity between
§ 411(a) and § 507 must be construed in favor of defendants to
require registration in criminal cases. Accordingly, the
commentors' and the Department of Justice's interpretation
of pre-2008 § 411(a) was flawed because that interpretation
did not fully consider the entirety of the Copyright Act.
2. While the October 2008 Amendments to § 411(a)
Require That a Work Be Registered Before a Civil
Infringement Action, the Amendments Do Not Fully
Resolve the Ambiguity Surrounding Whether Criminal
Infringement Prosecutions Require Registration
As mentioned, § 411(a) was amended to require that a
work must be registered before that work can be the subject
of a civil infringement action. While these amendments make
clear the underpinnings of a civil infringement action, the
amendments nevertheless create a new ambiguity that
warrants that the same registration prerequisite applies to
criminal prosecutions.
Although no court had ever undertaken to resolve the
existing ambiguity in the copyright law regarding registration
and criminal infringement prosecutions, § 411(a) was
amended on October 13, 200869 to clarify that registration
66. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1952)).
67. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
68. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 781 (2002) (citing
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)). The fact that the Department
of Justice proposed legislation that would clearly criminalize infringement of
unregistered works strongly suggests that the present laws do not criminalize
such infringement. See supra note 14.
69. October 13, 2008 was after this article was written and accepted for
publication.
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was a prerequisite to civil infringement actions as follows
(amendments shown with bold underlining):
Registration and Civil Infringement Actions
(a) Except for an action brought for a violation of the
rights of the author under section 106A(a), and
subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil
action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title.°
The statute now makes plain that registration is
necessary for "civil actions." Given that Congress made clear
that civil infringement actions require registration, it is
arguable that because Congress knew how to make
registration a prerequisite for civil infringement actions,
Congress did not intend for that prerequisite to apply to
criminal infringement prosecutions.1
At the same time, however, the title of amended § 411(a)
makes clear that the section addresses only civil actions, and
Congress did not in 2008 create or amend another statutory
section to address the parallel issue of criminal infringement
prosecutions. Given that Congress addressed civil
infringement actions but declined to provide any guidance-
other than implication-by-silence-regarding criminal
infringement prosecutions, the rule of lenity should apply to
require that criminal prosecutions be based on registered
works when the choice between what is a crime and what is
not turns on the uncertain implication of congressional
silence;72 "when interpreting a criminal statute that does not
70. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4257 (2008).
71. E.g., Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994)
(while "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose
to do so," because Congress did not use the words "aid" and "abet" in the statute,
Congress did not impose liability for aiding and abetting); Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954) (observing "no indication that Congress
intended to make this phase of national banking subject to local restrictions, as
it has done by express language in several other instances").
72. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) ("When choice has to be
made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.") (emphasis added);
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (where prosecution's
position is not "unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve
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explicitly reach the conduct in question, we are reluctant to
base an expansive reading on inferences drawn from
subjective and variable 'understandings.' ""
C. Registration Is Necessary to Maintain Criminal
Prosecution for Copyright Infringement
1. Because Civil Copyright Law Guides Criminal
Copyright Law, the Civil Requirement of Registration
Should Apply to Criminal Infringement Proceedings
As several courts have noted, criminal copyright law
looks to civil copyright law for guidance: "In order to
understand the meaning of criminal copyright infringement,
it is necessary to resort to the civil law of copyright."74 Hence,
because registration is necessary to maintain a civil
infringement action, the linkage between civil and criminal
copyright law mandates that registration is likewise a
condition precedent to jurisdiction over criminal copyright
cases.
While an unregistered work may be infringed, no civil
action for copyright infringement may be maintained until
the author has attempted to register her work.75 Several
courts have in fact held that copyright registration is a
prerequisite to jurisdiction over an infringement suit.76 Some
the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor").
73. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 218 (1985) (expressing
reluctance to criminalize copyright-related activity that the copyright statute
did not expressly address).
74. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1189 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting "the
general principle in copyright law of looking to civil authority for guidance in
criminal cases").
75. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). There are undeniably attractive public policy-
based reasons for not requiring registration before institution of a criminal
infringement prosecution. First, the government has no power to register a
work on behalf of an author, which effectively means that the government's
interests are independent from those of the author. See UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 23. Second, there is an undeniable public interest
in preventing infringement. Further, it is arguably inefficient to preempt an
infringement prosecution merely because the copyright owner delayed in
registering her work. Nevertheless, if an author does not register her copyright,
§ 411 bars her from enforcing her rights in a civil suit, and it would be
incongruous to allow the government to enforce a right the copyright owner
could not.
76. Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 156 (1st Cir. 2007);
La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th
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of these courts have gone so far as to hold that a prospective
plaintiff must have an actual certificate of registration before
filing their infringement suit.7 7 Because of the dependency of
criminal copyright law on civil copyright law,78 the fact that
registration is necessary for court jurisdiction over a civil
infringement suit suggests registration is likewise necessary
to jurisdiction over a criminal proceeding.
Several court decisions illustrate the lockstep linkage
between civil and criminal copyright principles. In United
States v. Manzer,79 for example, the defendant appealed his
criminal copyright conviction on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence that his infringement of a particular
computer program was willful.8 °  His appeal was
unsuccessful. The court of appeals noted that the plastic
module containing the computer program at issue had a
legible copyright label, and the program itself contained a
copyright notice that would have been easily read with a
standard debugging program.8 ' The court concluded that had
the case been a civil suit for damages only, either of these
notices would have given the defendant sufficient knowledge
of the copyright so as to rebut a possible defense of innocent
infringement.8 2  Thus, because the evidence would not have
supported the civil defense of innocent infringement, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the evidence likewise did not
Cir. 2005) ("[W~e reject the proposition that § 411 confers federal court
jurisdiction for an infringement action upon mere submission of a copyright
application to the Copyright Office . . . [iun our view, the statute requires ...
actual registration."); Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394
F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004); Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354
F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2003); Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 283
(4th Cir. 2003); Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366, 368 (D. Md.
2005) ("It is axiomatic that copyright registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to bringing an action for infringement under the Copyright Act . .. § 411(a) ...
clearly evidences Congress's intent to require something more than application
for a copyright prior to filing suit."); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp.
2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding registration necessary for jurisdiction over
infringement suit).
77. Strategy Source, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7.
78. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1189 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting "the
general principle in copyright law of looking to civil authority for guidance in
criminal cases").
79. United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1995).
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support Manzer's criminal defense of no willfulness.83
Other courts have similarly applied civil copyright
analyses to the criminal copyright context.8 4 In United States
v. Moran, 85 the court applied the civil copyright definition of
"willful" to a criminal case, reasoning that criminal cases
should be no less strict than civil ones; "since Congress used
'willful' in the civil damage copyright context to mean that the
infringement must take place with the defendant being
knowledgeable that his/her conduct constituted copyright
infringement, there is no compelling reason to adopt a less
stringent requirement in the criminal copyright context."6
Thus, the Moran court concluded that it would be illogical to
apply a different-and less demanding-standard to criminal
prosecutions than to civil actions where there was no
congressional suggestion to do so. Likewise, in United States
v. Cross,7 the Seventh Circuit upheld the use of the civil
definition of "willful" in the jury instructions in a criminal
case, noting that courts had previously found constitutional
the use of the Copyright Act's civil definition of
"infringement" to criminal actions. 8 These cases make plain
that courts do not hesitate to apply civil copyright principles
to criminal cases.
Hence, because criminal copyright law draws directly
from civil copyright law,89  the civil requirement of
registration90 likewise demands registration in the criminal
context. Courts have made clear that criminal copyright law
should not include activity that would not also support a civil
infringement action,91 which in turn makes clear that works
must be registered before a criminal infringement action may
83. Id.
84. E.g., Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[C]onduct
that does not support a civil action for infringement cannot constitute criminal
conduct.").
85. United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
86. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
87. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1987).
88. Id. at 303 (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
89. Cross, 816 F.2d at 303; Wise, 550 F.2d at 1189 n.14.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006); e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors
Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2005).
91. Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Neb. 1991).
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commence. 92 Given that the courts have made clear that
criminal copyright law follows civil copyright law, the fact
that Congress recently amended § 411(a) to require
registration for civil infringement actions further establishes
that registration is likewise necessary for criminal
infringement prosecutions.
2. Registration Is a Purely Administrative
Determination That Must Be Pursued and
"Exhausted" Before Seeking Relief in Court
A third reason that the copyright laws do not authorize
criminal prosecution for infringement of unregistered works
is that allowing such actions would effectively permit
criminal prosecution of a defendant for violating a right that
had not yet been fully recognized as enforceable by the
relevant administrative agency. The Supreme Court has
noted that "[a] copyright, like other intellectual property,
comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited
interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact
protections."94 But because the copyright holder cannot
enforce these "carefully delimited interests" until the
Copyright Office has had the opportunity to review the
work,95 it follows that such administrative review should be a
prerequisite to criminal enforcement because, as a general
rule, judicial relief is not available until the relevant
administrative remedy has been exhausted.96
That administrative agencies should exercise their own
expert judgment before a criminal case is allowed to proceed
was addressed by the Supreme Court in McKart v. United
States.97 In that case, the petitioner had been convicted of
failing to report for duty in the Armed Services.95 The
petitioner challenged in court the draft classification given to
him by the Selective Service Board court without first
92. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. at 39; Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1050.
93. Cross, 816 F.2d at 303; Wise, 550 F.2d at 1189 n.14 (noting "the general
principle in copyright law of looking to civil authority for guidance in criminal
cases"); L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. at 39; Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1050.
94. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985).
95. An author must preregister or attempt to register her work before
initiating a civil infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
96. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
97. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
98. Id. at 197-98.
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exhausting his administrative remedies in the Selective
Service System.99
The McKart Court concluded that the petitioner need not
have exhausted his administrative remedies in that case
because the question of his proper draft classification was
purely one of statutory interpretation.'00 The Court reasoned
that unless a case involved purely legal issues that did not
require any particular expertise on the part of the agency,
administrative remedies had to be pursued before resort to
the courts.01 The Court went on to observe that "it is well to
remember that use of the exhaustion doctrine in criminal
cases can be exceedingly harsh,"'0 2 and concluded that
because the dispositive issue in a case was one of statutory
interpretation, there was no need to wait for an agency to
exercise its discretion or apply its expertise. 0 3
By contrast, the question whether a work is
copyrightable is the essence of agency expertise; "the question
of whether the technical requirements for registration have
been met is the province of the Copyright Office,""4 and it is
up to the Copyright Office "to determine in the first instance
whether a filer has complied with the technical requirements
for a registration certificate.' 1 5 Given that copyrights carry
with them valuable, "carefully delimited interests,"' 6 and
because it is the Copyright Office in the first instance that
determines whether a work qualifies for all the legal
protections afforded to a copyrighted work-which
determination is purely a matter of the Copyright Office's
agency expertise' 07-the Copyright Office should be given the
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 197-98.
102. Id. at 197.
103. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S 185, 198-99 (1969).
104. Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v. Curran, No. 97-CV-0576 (TCP), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23142, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1998) (citing Fonar Corp. v. Domenick,
105 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
105. Fonar, 105 F.3d at 105; see also Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp.
2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005) ("[Tlhis Court should not exercise its jurisdiction
prematurely and 'prejudge' a [registration] determination to be made by the
Copyright Office.").
106. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985).
107. See Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech, 307 F.3d 775, 781
(9th Cir. 2002) (yielding to the Copyright Office on the question whether that
office had properly followed its own regulations in granting registration).
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opportunity to determine whether the copyright attaches to a
particular work before criminal proceedings for infringement
can be initiated.
Copyright cases addressing the situation where a
plaintiff who has registered a version of a work brings an
infringement action for alleged infringement of a different,
unregistered version of the work further support the principle
that infringement actions may only be based on what the
Copyright Office has actually considered. These numerous
cases do not allow actions based on infringement of the
unregistered version to proceed, concluding that registration
of the earlier version of a work does not grant jurisdiction
over the related-but unregistered-version of that same
work."8  As Judge Selya wrote in Johnson v. Gordon,
"elements distinct to an unregistered work cannot draw
protection from a registered work even though the latter may
contain the seminal idea that inspired both works." 19
Accordingly, cases that arise in this analogous context
support the argument that there is no federal court
jurisdiction over an infringement action based on a work the
Copyright Office has not formally reviewed.
Further support for the concept that review by an
administrative agency is necessary to maintenance of a
criminal action is also found in the analogous context of
criminal trademark infringement proceedings. In the
trademark context, criminal proceedings for copying a mark
cannot be maintained unless the infringing mark is identical
with, or substantially indistinguishable from a registered
mark."o More specifically, "[c]riminal liability can only occur
'if a spurious mark is used on or in connection with goods or
services for which the genuine mark is actually registered...
108. See Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005) (infringement
action based on elements present only in later, unregistered version of song
could not proceed based on registration of earlier, registered version of song);
Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir.
2003) (registration for earlier, smaller version of toy did not provide jurisdiction
over claim of infringement of later, larger version of toy). The Eleventh Circuit,
however, held to the contrary in Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.
1999). In that case, the court concluded that registration of an earlier version of
a work supported jurisdiction over a claim that a later, unregistered version of
work had been infringed. Id. at 1292-93.
109. Johnson, 409 F.3d at 20.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d
1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005).
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and is in use.' ""', Hence, no criminal proceedings can take
place unless the mark's owner registers the mark for use in
the specific field in which the infringer operates;112 an alleged
infringer's use of that mark in a different field is not
infringing.113  Thus, in the trademark context, criminal
penalties only attach to the unauthorized use of a mark in the
field where the mark was registered, not anywhere else.
Applying this principle to the copyright context, criminal
penalties likewise attach to the unauthorized use (i.e.,
infringement of a work) only when the work has been
registered.
Patent law likewise embraces the principle that full
administrative acknowledgement of the originality of the
work at issue is necessary to support infringement actions.
Under the patent laws, a patent holder can recover damages
for infringement of her patent before the patent is issued by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but these
backward-looking damages only apply to the period between
when the patent application was made publicly available and
when the Patent Office actually grants the patent."4 Thus,
copyright, trademark, and patent law all embrace the concept
that administrative review is required for full, legal
protection of an intellectual property right.
The preregistration scheme set forth in the recent
amendments to the Copyright Act does not resolve this issue.
111. United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
S. REP. No. 526, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3636).
112. Giles, 213 F.3d at 1251-52.
113. See id. (vacating conviction for defendant's use of registered mark on
clothing where mark registered only for use on handbags, wallets, gloves, and
other similar accessories).
The court in Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Universal Tel-a-Talk, Inc., No. CIV. A.
96-CV-6961, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8231 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1998), reached the
same conclusion. In that case, the defendants operated a website featuring
certain images that included some of Playboy's trademarks-including the well-
known Playboy rabbit head emblem-to highlight specific links to particular
images. Id. at *4. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had failed
to make out a claim because the plaintiffs had not registered their marks for
use on websites: "[A] claim for trademark counterfeiting lies only against a
defendant's counterfeit uses of a mark on the same goods or services as are
covered by the plaintiffs registration of that mark." Id.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2006). Patent applicants may also seek expedited
review of their applications by alleging that there is a device or method
available on the market that would infringe the patent claims under review by
the Patent Office. See 1 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §
708.02.11 (8th ed. 2006).
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Because the Copyright Office does not review a
preregistration application, there is no determination of
whether the underlying work is worthy of registration, and
the mere fact that a work is preregistered is no guarantee
that the work will ever in fact be registered. 115 It would be
inequitable to permit a criminal prosecution premised on a
property right that the rights holder cannot themselves
exercise.
Accordingly, without explicit recognition by the
Copyright Office, any elements of a work that are not
registered-which logically includes elements that were never
registered-cannot serve as the basis for an infringement
action. If, on the other hand, registration were not a
requirement for commencing a criminal infringement action,
prosecutors could initiate prosecutions for infringement of
works whose privileged status as copyrighted was not
enforceable at the time of indictment. Allowing such
prosecutions would be analogous to giving the government-
which effectively acts as the plaintiff in criminal cases-a
property interest in something (i.e., a copyright infringement
action) that was not yet fully in existence. 116
D. Preregistration Does Not Serve as a Substitute for
Registration
While some commentators suggest that a criminal action
may be brought for infringement of a preregistered work,11 7
preregistration does not provide a proper legal basis for a
criminal infringement prosecution. As previously described, a
preregistration application does not give the Copyright Office
the chance to fully evaluate the merits of the work, which
evaluation is necessary to provide full protection for the
copyright.18  Moreover, there is no guarantee that the
115. "The fact that a work has been preregistered does not mean that the
Copyright Office necessarily will register the work when an application for
registration is submitted." See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 31.
116. United States v. O'Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding
that defendant in criminal forfeiture case who failed to comply with conditions
of existing escrow agreement could not have complete, matured interest in
property and had no standing to challenge forfeiture).
117. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 22-24; DuBose,
supra note 11, at 488-89.
118. See supra Part III.C.2.
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preregistered work will actually be registered, 119 and it would
be illogical to allow criminal prosecution based on a violation
of an intellectual property right that was not yet fully
enforceable.
E. Solutions
As discussed, the copyright laws currently fail to provide
for criminal actions for infringement of unregistered or
preregistered works. But because the harm from such
infringement is undeniable-and because infringement of an
unregistered work may be equal to the harm caused by
infringement of a bona fide registered work-the issue must
nevertheless be addressed.
1. Solution 1
One possible solution to the shortcomings would simply
be to amend 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) to state that criminal
prosecutions could be initiated based on infringement of
unregistered or preregistered works. This solution is
imperfect, however, because it effectively grants full copyright
protection and enforcement to a work that has not actually
achieved such recognition from the Copyright Office. Thus,
this solution merely codifies the suggestion by certain
commentators that criminal proceedings should be available
for infringement of any work, provided that the infringement
meets the criteria of the relevant criminal statute. As
described earlier in Part III of this article, however, these
suggestions are based on a failure to fully consider the import
of the registration process, and such an amendment would
accordingly be legally unsound.
2. Solution 2
As mentioned, Congress amended § 411(a) to clarify that
registration of the underlying work is a prerequisite for a civil
infringement action. But, as discussed above, those
amendments only clarify the law regarding civil infringement
actions and do not settle the uncertainty regarding the role of
registration in criminal infringement prosecutions. To do so,
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) could be amended to state:
119. See supra note 115.
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Registration and Civil Actions and Criminal
Proceedings
"(a) Except for an action brought for a violation of the
rights of the author under section 106A(a), and
subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil
action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title, and no criminal
proceeding shall be instituted until registration
of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title. In any case, however,
where the deposit, application, and fee required for
registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been
refused, a civil action or criminal proceeding the
applicant is entitled to institute ani netion for
infringement may be instituted if notice thereof,
with a copy of the complaint, criminal information,
or indictment, is served on the Register of
Copyrights[.1" (Suggested additions and deletions
shown.)
These amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) would clarify
that while civil actions may be based on registered or
preregistered works, criminal actions may only be maintained
for infringement of registered works. These amendments
would preserve the intended effect of the preregistration
scheme-i.e., to broaden the availability of civil infringement
actions-while ensuring that criminal actions could only be
instituted once a work had properly been subjected to
complete Copyright Office review through the registration
process.
3. Solution 3
One solution that occupies a middle ground between
Solutions 1 and 2-i.e., somewhere between allowing criminal
infringement actions for all works and allowing criminal
infringement actions for only registered works-would be to
alter the preregistration rules such that the Copyright Office
makes some determination regarding the merits of the work
during the preregistration process that entitles the owner to
less protection than a fully registered copyright but
nevertheless provides a basis for a criminal infringement
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proceeding. This would provide for criminal prosecution of
infringement of preregistered works while also avoiding the
problem of lack of administrative review previously described.
This solution, however, is impractical in that (1) the solution
would burden the Copyright Office with having to perform
quasi-registration reviews of works submitted for
preregistration, and (2) the solution would elevate
preregistration to a level it has not previously occupied.
Of these solutions, Solution 2 rests on the soundest legal
basis. The amended statute suggested there would permit
criminal infringement proceedings only for works that had
achieved full administrative protection from the Copyright
Office. Furthermore, Solution 2 would not impose any new
burdens on the Copyright Office, as would Solution 3. Thus,
by amending the statute to clarify that criminal
prosecutions-at least under the current registration
scheme-are not available for infringement of unregistered or
preregistered works, the precise boundaries of the copyright
laws can be better clarified for those who author
copyrightable works and for those who criminally prosecute-
and defend-their infringement.
CONCLUSION
With the spread of interconnected computers and their
sophisticated users has come an attendant increase of
unauthorized copying and distribution of authors' original
works. To address this ongoing problem, Congress amended
the copyright laws to expand federal courts' jurisdiction over
civil infringement actions for infringement of works that are
merely preregistered and have not attained full registered
status with the Copyright Office. While courts now have
jurisdiction over certain infringement actions based on
preregistered works, the suggestion 12  that formal, full
registration is not necessary to support a criminal
infringement action is misplaced, even in light of the recent
amendments to the copyright laws.12'
First, because registration is a condition precedent to a
civil action, the established link between civil copyright law
120. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 11.4.1; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 11, at 22-24; DuBose, supra note 11, at 488-89.
121. See supra Part III.
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and the criminal copyright context counsels in favor of
requiring registration before initiation of a criminal
prosecution.'22 As discussed, because the copyright laws were
ambiguous regarding whether the term "actions" includes
both civil suits and criminal prosecutions, or only addresses
civil suits, the rule of lenity'23 required that this ambiguity be
construed in favor of the defendant to require registration
before initiation of a criminal infringement proceeding.
While the recent amendments arguably resolve some of
this statutory ambiguity, the amendments address only civil
infringement suits. While it is at least arguable that
Congress's choice to address registration only in the civil
context implies that Congress did not intend registration in
the criminal context, the amendments are nevertheless silent
regarding criminal matters. The rule of lenity cautions
against reading Congress's silence regarding criminal
prosecutions as going so far as to approve such prosecutions
in the absence of registration.
Finally, copyright, trademark, and patent law all
acknowledge the basic principle that administrative review is
required before an intellectual property right is fully
protected. 124  Logically, then, this full protection and any
subsequent enforcement cannot occur unless the Copyright
Office has the opportunity to evaluate an author's
registration application for her work. This acknowledgement
of the importance of administrative review further
emphasizes that the Copyright Office must pass on the merits
of a particular work through the formal registration process
before that work can serve as the basis for a criminal
infringement action.
There will always be those with the willingness and the
ability to distribute authors' work, and the injury that
infringement of both registered and unregistered works
causes is undeniable. 125  Although it is tempting to use
criminal prosecutions to address infringement of works
regardless of their registration status, the legal basis for such
prosecutions is unsound, 126 and the copyright laws should be
122. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1189 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
124. See supra Part III.C.2.
125. See SIWEK, supra note 1, at 14.
126. See supra Part III.
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amended to allow criminal infringement prosecutions only for
formally registered works. Despite the harm that
infringement of unregistered works may cause and general
public policy against letting infringement go unpunished,
combating such infringement with criminal prosecutions that
lack a proper legal basis creates its own set of problems.

